The purpose of this study is to present a portrait of the foreign aid flow to Ethiopia 
I. Introduction
In 2005, the Gross Domestic Product of Ethiopia reached 74.5 billion Birr ($ 8.6 billion USD) 1 .
During the same year, the economy grew at 8.8% compared to previous year. In five years (between 2000 and 2005) , the economy added over 14 billion birr ($1.6 billion USD). At the aggregate, this is significant improvement for a country with the frequent climate calamites and poor infrastructure. Per capita wise, the same improvement may not be evident and Ethiopia remains on the lower step of the ladder that helps climb the hill of development. With the optimistic population estimate of 73 million people in 2005, the per capita income of the country was 1020 birr ($117 USD) (IMF, 2006) . This number is the lowest in the world in any standard. Various explanations can be posed for the limited improvement (per capita wise) of the economy ranging from liberalization (globalization) to population growth not only for Ethiopia but also for similar economies around the world. Aid inflow has been advocated for as one of the panaceas since 1950s, nevertheless, results of recent studies and reports is, at best, mixed.
Along with the growth in the overall economy comes increased government spending and deficit financing. The government collected about $2.3 billion dollars including taxes and grants during 2004/2005 fiscal year. Out of which, $0.5 billion dollars (22%) was in the form of grants. During the same year, the government spent $2.8 billion dollars and hence the revenue, including grants, was short of total expenditure by $0.6 billion dollars. With out grants the deficit could have been about $1 billion dollars. This makes the grant element of government's total expenditure 21% ($0.6/$2.8). Of the 22% external grant that constitute part 1 At that time, the exchange rate was $1= 8.65 birr.
of government revenue, 50% comes in the form of grants in kind (or earmarked) and the remaining 50% comes in the form of untied cash (IMF, 2006) .
How did the government finance the deficit? In principle, government could use both domestic and external sources of finance that a country can tap to finance the deficit. What is relevant for countries like Ethiopia is to finance deficits through hard currency since significant part of the financing is required to cover expenses spent in hard currencies to import essential goods.
To this effect, external borrowing to finance the deficit accounts for 41% of total deficit during 2004/2005 fiscal year. The remaining sources of financing come from domestic borrowing and privatization revenue 2 .
Overall, the country depends on external source of finance for about 29% of its total government spending. As stated above, 19% comes in the form of budgetary support grant and the remaining 10% comes as external borrowing. Arguments in favor of more grants than loans seem to have been practiced in Ethiopia at least during the early 2000s. Aid in the form of grant has been preferred over loans for several reasons (Rogoff, 2005, Bulow and Rogoff, 2005) . Grantonly aid has been supported to prevent future debt crisis and to lift the tax burden from the week economies of recipient countries. It is also argued that grantonly approach will eliminate the "bad cop" role of development banks in enforcing debt payments. Clement and et. al. (2004) , on the other hand, despised the idea of grantonly aid due to its negative implications on the collection of domestic revenue. Their study reveals that an increase in aid inflow in the form of grant is associated with a decrease in domestic revenue collection, which 2 Note that privatization receipts used account for the larger share during the late 1990s but its role declined in recent years since most public enterprises have either been privatized or government decides to hold on to them.
eventually strain government budget. Both lines of arguments qualify their respective conclusions with the need to enhance domestic institutions to respond to domestic revenue collection capacities but also to improve transparency in the operation of governments.
Whether the sources of financing is something to worry about depends on who gives us the grants, for what purposes they give us, when they give us, and whether we can count on them at all times. If the sources are predictable and do not depend on regimes, one can plan accordingly to make longterm plans. Otherwise, it is difficult to make progress in development with sporadic flow of money now and then. It is important for the predictability of the aid money to look at not only which countries account for the larger share of official bilateral flows and which aid agencies account for the larger share of multilateral creditors but also for what purposes the country has been receiving aid. Did they have preferences for any particular regime over the other? Do the national interests of the donors affect the pattern of aid flow into the country?
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to look into the profile of the aid flow in to the country during 19602003. Special attention is given to the following questions. Who is giving when?
Who is giving for what purpose/sector? Who is giving and in what form? Whose aid support/ killed the agricultural sector of the country? The aim is to present a draft portrait of aid flow to the country; no attempt is made to relate flows of aid to the performance of the economy, or no attempt is made to show the effectiveness of the aid flow. The remaining sections are divided as follows: the next chapter will present sources of data and methodology used in the paper, section three background information, and data on the flow of aid to the country; sections four and five give detailed account of the major donors and sector distribution of aid, respectively; the last section concludes the paper.
II. Data Sources and Methods
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has collected aid data from its members through its Development Assistant Committee (DAC) and Creditors
Reporting System (CRS) questionnaires issued by the OECD secretariat. . This makes it difficult to compare this data set with the geographic distribution data set described above. Obviously, the CRS data underestimates the aid flow not only for each sector but also for the total inflow. Nevertheless, even with the caveats, one can use this data as an approximation especially after 1999. In this paper, since coverage ratio of multilateral aid distributions are low, only bilateral aid distributions are employed.
The methods used to analysis the aid data are lowess, which is local regression smoothing, and simply bar graphs. Lowess is derived from the term "locally weighted scatter plot smooth," as both methods use locally weighted linear regression to smooth data. The smoothing process is considered local because each smoothed value is determined by neighboring data points defined within the span. The process is weighted because a regression weight function is defined for the data points contained within the span. Bar graphs are used to compare aid flows by donors multilateral and bilateral -across regimes, sectors, and forms (type) of aid flows to Ethiopia. Comparisons are made in terms of both average flows and total flows for each donor, regime, sector, and forms of flows. With few exceptions, there is no variation in trends whether one looks into the average flows or the total flows for each donor for the geographic distribution aid data. For the sectoral distribution data, since coverage ratios are less than 100%, only average aid flows are reported in all cases, for obvious reason that total aid inflows would be misleading.
III. Background on Aid Flows and Donors
There is no doubt that Ethiopia has been and is being used as a poster child (for international organizations, NGOs and recently rock bands) to generate aid money. Two famines that devastated the northern part of the country in 1970s and 1980s that still resonates among the public in the West prompted altruistic activities. The two worldwide music events (liveaid and live8), to garner millions of aid money from official and private donors, made it clear that aid money is not just to develop a country in the longrun but to save life that needs emergency assistances. Credit goes to those who sponsored, organized, and contributed to those events to help save life of those in need at the time of emergency. While providing urgent needs, the country and international goodwishers should look across the horizon to provide sustainable support mechanism for the people.
Various key reasons have been forwarded to explain the dismal nature of the economy. At the same time alternatives mechanism have been suggested to tackle the problem once and for all.
Some commentators argue that restrictive religious practice is to blame for it forces the people to stay home for almost half of the time during a given month. They went further to suggest that the country needs not only additional support in the form of aid but also a new calendar (Wiedemann, 2005) . While other question the longterm contribution of aid that comes into the country. For instance, McLaughlin (2004) argues that because of the direct effect of food aid from U.S. cookingoil industry in the Ethiopia had to shut down. There are other similar anecdotes that highlight the need for more aid and at the same time the need for restraint on aid to protect local economy.
There is also other concern with respect to aid flow: debt burden. As it is happening in other part of the world, aid in the form of loan -in cash or in kind -has implications on debt crisis.
Although Ethiopia is not at an alarming rate with this regard, one needs to look into the current state of the debt burden for reference purposes. Yamano, et. al (2003) presents the role food aid in rural Ethiopia, whereas Maxwell (1996) investigates the effectiveness of European aid to Ethiopia. Although the sprit of this current study and previous studies is the same -to document the profile of aid flow, this study not only uses latest and more detailed data but also presents aid flow by regime, type of aid and purpose of aid that the country has been receiving since 1960. .06
mean of aidm 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Data 19912003) . It is important to note that Eritrea was part of Ethiopia until 1993; hence, the data have not been adjusted for that at least until 1990. This may overestimate the aid flow to Ethiopia, this is especially true for the first two regimes, as some commentators claim, since significant share of the aid money have been invested or spent on Eritrea to appease the then guerilla fighters and the current leaders of Eritrea.
As one can expect, the imperial regime received the least total (and average) aid flows compared to the other two regimes. At least two reasons account for this. Internationally, pre 1970 was the period when cold war was not the major factor for countries to help others through aid to attract them to their camp. The second reason for the invisible flow of aid to the country was due to the decision by the regime of Ethiopia at that time to hide from international media attention the drought and famine that had swept the northern part of the country. Hence, although food aid accounts for significant share during the last two regimes, it was at the bottom during the imperial regime ( Figure 5 ). For the last two regimes, average aid money in the form of ODA grant tops the list. For the first regime, capital flow to the private sector came first. In terms of total aid money 4 , Aid in the form of technical cooperation ranks second for the first two regimes where as ODA loan was second for the current regime. Given the current government's willingness to adopt reform policies in line with the Washington consensus, aid money in the form of loan is easily forthcoming. As stated above, for the last two regimes, aid in the form of food aid takes the fourth place where as aid flows to private sectors were at the bottom of the list for the last two regimes. There are some differences between the average and the total aid flow during the period under consideration. One of the surprises is that aid money that went to the private sector (contractual lending and export credits) jumped to the top of the list for the imperial regime, and came second in the list (following ODA grant) during the military regime where as it came third for the current regime following ODA grant and ODA loan ( Figure 5 ). It is surprising to the see aid money for the private sector during the military regime, which is a staunch supporter of command economy that advocates for the state control of the economic machinery.
In terms of major multilateral donors during each regime, EU, UN agencies, the World Bank, World Food Program, and African Development Bank/Fund top the list irrespective of regime change. EU was at the top of the list in terms of total aid flow followed by UN agencies and the World Bank for the first two regimes where as for the current regime World Bank comes second. Similar pattern can be observed for the average aid flow, except that for all the three regimes the World Bank came closer to the top of the list (Figure 6 ). If history is any guide, looking at the average aid inflow, the aid money that is coming through the World Bank and the private sector seem to be predictable and consistent throughout the period of study (more on this in the later sections). Italy, which had been in the top four for the past two regimes.
For the current regime, the good news is that other bilateral donors have been entering the list and made significant contributions in terms of average aid inflow, at least compared to the imperial regime. These countries are Norway, Canada, Ireland, France, Finland, Belgium, Switzerland, Australia, Denmark, and Austria. It is good news not just for the current regime but also for the country as a whole since the list is dominated by Scandinavian countries whose aid often times destined for humanitarian purposes rather than to achieve donor country national interests, as it is alleged for the other western donor countries. 
Who was giving in what form?
In previous sections, it has been noted that the major bilateral donors and the different forms in which the country has been receiving aid. Now let us see the break down of forms by which the aid money has been coming and which countries gave in what form. The focus is on those major donors (U.S., Canada, Japan, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and U.K.) and the recent additions to the list especially after the overthrow of the military regime (Norway, Australia, France, and Ireland). Almost all major donors gave aid in the form of ODA grant as their major means. It is no a surprise that for the major crop producing countries like Canada, U.K., Norway, and U.S (countries that support their agricultural sector); food aid was their next best means to hand in aid. Cline indicates that during the period 20002002, on average, outputdistorting subsidies as percent of agricultural output were 19.9% for U.S., 1.65% for Canada, and 36.2% for European Union (Cline, 2004) . It is important to note that food aid, as it is presented here, does not include emergency and relief food delivered during the times of distress in the country. The food aid listed here is categorized as aid under program assistance.
If one adds food aid under program assistance and that listed under emergency and relief, the proportion would have been much higher for these countries.
Aid in the form of technical cooperation comes next to ODA grant for Sweden, Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, and France. For the other major donors, aid in the form of technical assistance ranks third following grant and food aid. The world's biggest economies -U.S, Germany, and Japan also gave significant amount of development loans to Ethiopia ( Figure   8 ). It seems that, for most of the countries, during the study period aid came in kind -food aid and technical cooperation than in cash. Aid in kind comes with its shortcomings. First, the aid may help particular sector, which may not be the priority of the country, probably the country might want to have cash to buy food from surplus producing regions of the country rather than receiving food in kind. The same issue can be raised for the case of technical cooperation, for instance in the form of training, which may help sectors that may not be at the priority of the being sold in backdoor markets and the proceeds may be embezzled by officials. The same problem can also be raised for the case of aid in cash; however, in the case of food aid the targeted recipients live in remote places, and it is difficult to track down whether they have actually received the food intended for them and how that affects the rural economy. For instance, see Zhang, 2004 for the likely effects of food aid on the local and international food markets. Technical cooperation seems better in this regard since the purpose is to increase the skill (human capital) level and the physical capital stock in the country, which can be easily verifiable. 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 1 .15 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 There is something to rejoice though, all the major forms/types of capital inflows show increasing trend, especially in recent years. Flows to the private sector (FDI, Portfolio, and other private) and in the form of Official Development Assistances (both grants and loans)
were pouring in at increasing rate in recent years. The other major forms of aid flow Food Aid and Technical Cooperation registered an increased flow although at a decreasing rate (Figure 11 ). This looks a healthy sign for emerging economy where official aid flows are replaced by private capital flows. However, for a country like Ethiopia where the capital market is not well developed (or none existent) and where the effect of the aid flow has been just started to be felt in most rural parts of the country, it is too early to expect the role of private capital flows to play significant role in the country. It may be unhealthy if the rate of infrastructure development lags behind that of the private capital flow. It is important to note here that the private capital flows are just a recent phenomenon. If one can check back Figure 2 that presents average aid flow by type of flow, compared to other forms of capital flow, flows to the private sector are at the bottom of the list. This seems an expected outcome where flow of money to the private sector is waiting for the effect of development grants and loans to be felt across the interlinked sectors of the economy. . 3 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
V. Distribution of Aid by Sector/Purpose: 19732003
The OECD dataset also compiled information on aid flow by purpose or sectoral distribution.
Since the data reported for each donor and for each year are not complete, only average aid flows are used for discussion purposes in this part of the study. The major sectors/purposes used in the OECD dataset are described in the Appendix. The sectors are social infrastructure and services, economic infrastructure and services, production sectors, emergency assistance, help with debt, multisector, program assistance, and unallocated/unspecified. According to the definition of OECD, these sectors can be grouped into two: aid for (direct) production activities (including infrastructure and services) and aid for nonproductive (including emergency assistances). Productive activities include allocation of aid to social and economic infrastructure and service, production sectors, and multisectors. Nonproductive activities include aid flows to program assistances as well as emergency assistances, which mainly refer to food aid, and help with aid. As one can see from figure 12, during the period 19732003, large sum of aid money went to the nonproductive activities, mainly program and emergency assistances and help with aid. The exception is that the fund that was destined for social infrastructure and services was in the middle of the top lists. On average basis, considering all donors, aid allocations to almost all directly productive sectors were at the bottom of the list.
It is worthy of the time and space to talk more about one of the nonproductive purposes for which the country received during this period: Help with debt. It seems that help with the debt initiatives got much publicity after the 1996 HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) initiative by the World Bank and IMF; later followed by similar initiative after the Gleneagles summit in July 2005. The objective of both initiatives is to cancel all or most of the debt owed by poor countries of the world. Ethiopia has been benefiting from both initiatives, but what is relevant for the period study is the HIPC initiatives. The initiative sounds and looks convincing and altruistic from donors and recipients point of view in that it relieves poor countries from debt services that they could not manage to pay now. Developing countries scholars and commentators, however, immediately raised question regarding the initiatives. One concern that keeps coming is that debt relief may end up being a substitute for additional aid. Donors who consider debt cancellation may not plan to extend fresh grants or loans, but poor countries, despite accumulated debt, still needs more grants and/or loans to finance their deficits or development projects (Arslanalp and Henry, 2006; Rogoff, 2005) . Hence, it may be to early to count on the debt relief component of aid unless fresh aid money keeps coming at a sustainable rate and magnitude. 
Sectoral Distribution of Aid by Regime
Only the last two regimes are considered for the sectoral distribution aid money since the data starts in 1973. The sectoral distribution of aid money for the current regime echoes that of the total allocation in that aid money mainly went to nonproductive activities with the exception of aid for the social infrastructure and service sector. It is surprising to see that the military regime received more money for productive sector than the current regime, despite the buzz about the extensive infrastructure development during the current regime. One can argue that although the aid statistics shows that the country had received aid money for productive activities during the military regime, some of that money might have been diverted to other nonproductive sector and resulted in the debt burden. It is also important to note that during both regimes, program assistance was one of the main aid recipient sectors, which mainly was in the form of food aid ( Figure 13 ). 
Sectoral Distribution of Aid inflow by Bilateral Donors
Which donors gave for productive sectors and which ones gave for nonproductive activities?
The draft description here echoes that of the preceding discussion where countries ranked by the type/method of aid (Figure 8 ). Figure 14 illustrates rank of donor countries under each sector. Countries that top the rank of aid flow to the emergency and program assistance are those listed as major food aid donors including the U.S, U.K, Norway, Canada, Germany, Sweden, and Japan. When it comes to emergency assistance, U.S and UK are at the top as they have the largest Ethiopian diaspora living in their country, and it is politically correct for the world powers to respond to emergency needs. Italy and Germany, in addition to their aid money that went to help with debt, also rank at the top for their aid flows to the production sector and economic infrastructure and services (following Japan). Flow of aid to the social infrastructure and services sector is toped by U.S followed by Germany, Sweden, and Ireland.
The figure further shows that, in terms of magnitude, Ethiopia received more aid money for emergency assistance from U.S than any other country and to any other sector during the three decades. Following that aid money went to help with debt and to program assistance, all of which, except perhaps program assistance, are not directly productive sectors. assistance has also jumped during early 1990s and remained stable since then. Help with debt has also jumped during late 1990s, however, it retuned to its historic average in recent years. followed by flows to the private sector (export credit and lending) and food aid, on average basis during 19602003. There is an upward trend in aid inflow in the form of foreign direct investment, portfolio, and flows through other private means. It is important to note that there were significant variations in aid flow across regimes in terms of the donors and the type/method that aid money have been delivered.
The major sectors that received the largest aid money during the last three regimes were program and emergency assistances (mainly food aid), social and infrastructure and services, and help with debt. There has also been significant variation across regimes and donors in terms of which sectors received the largest aid money. In recent years, emergency assistance and social infrastructure has been receiving aid at an increasing rate. Whereas other sectors, like economic infrastructure, production sector, and multisector have received aid at a declining rate. Perhaps it is normal to expect the inflow of private capital into the productive sectors by the time the effects of the flow of aid money to the social infrastructure development are being felt nationwide.
Definition of the terms used in the data sets
Grants: this heading covers transfers, in money or in kind, for which no repayment is required. It includes grants for technical cooperation, grantlike flows, i.e., loans extended by governments or official agencies in currencies of the donor countries but repayable in recipients' currencies and transfer of resources through sales of commodities for recipients' currencies, less local currency balances used by the donor for other than development purposes (for example, to defray the local costs of embassy operations).
The following are excluded: reparations and indemnification payments to private individuals, insurance and similar payments to residents of developing countries, and loans extended in and repayable in recipients' currencies.
Multilateral Agencies: the list of multilateral agencies for which data are shown separately in this report is given in the Introduction. To the extent possible, a distinction has been made between concessional and non concessional flows from multilateral agencies. Loan disbursements for which it was not possible to make this distinction on a transactionbytransaction basis have been treated as nonconcessional if made from "ordinary capital'' resources and as concessional if made from a "soft window''. Thus, for some agencies "total loans'' are significantly larger than loans on concessional terms, and the volume of loans on concessional terms actually received by the borrowing country may not be accurately measured.
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests: i) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and ii) it is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent. ODA Loans: loans with maturities of over one year and meeting the criteria set under ODA, extended by governments or official agencies, and for which repayment is required in convertible currencies or in kind. Rescheduling (maturity extension of loans originally made by a government or official agency) and loans made by a government or an official agency to refinance indebtedness due to the private or official sector, are included if reported as Official Development Assistance or Official Aid. The net data are reported after deduction of amortization payments and the impact of other measures reducing debt (e.g.forgiveness).
Technical Cooperation: This is defined as activities whose primary purpose is to augment the level of knowledge, skills, technical knowhow or productive aptitudes of the population of developing countries, i.e., increasing their stock of human intellectual capital, or their capacity for more effective use of their existing factor endowment. Accordingly, the figures relate mainly to activities involving the supply of human resources (teachers, volunteers, experts in various sectors) and action targeted on human resources (education, training, advice).
Private Sector Flows: is broken down into direct investment, portfolio investment, and export credits (net). The transactions covered are those undertaken by residents of DAC Member countries. Portfolio investment corresponds to bonds and equities. In the text, flows to the private sector is divided into three: foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and other private flows (including export credits, contractual leadings).
